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In some bargaining situations, agreement has implications for agents beyond the parties involved, 
and if so, delays in reaching an agreement or failing to reach an agreement, when this would be 
profitable, may imply significant welfare losses. The question raised in this paper is whether the 
intervention of a government, who has a positive valuation of agreement and therefore offers a 
subsidy, will reduce such delays and inabilities to reach agreement? Based on a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium in a sequential bargaining game with intervention, we show that in equilibrium 
intervention always reduces the ex ante equilibrium inefficiency and conditionally reduces 
expected delays in trade. However, for intervention in the form of a subsidy to take place, the 
aggregate of the seller’s reservation price and the externalities must be (almost) as high as the 
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When the iron curtain fell in 1989, large differences in the state of the 
environment between former eastern and western European countries were 
disclosed. For western European governments neighbouring eastern European 
countries this came as no surprise, as the old and dirty energy and manufacturing 
plants along the eastern side of the border had been the source of a continuous 
stream of transboundary polluting emissions for decades (www.amap.no, 
www.eea.europa.eu).  
 
From an economic point of view, the problem with transboundary pollution is that 
due to different jurisdictional areas, parts of the environmental damages caused by 
the pollution are not counted when abatement efforts are considered. Failing to 
internalise negative externalities implies that profitable abatement efforts are not 
implemented, which in turn gives welfare losses. When this situation continues, 
the welfare loss aggregates and may take on substantial magnitudes.   
 
The use of financial support (subsidies) to foreign plants to motivate them to 
invest in new technology and thus step up the conversion process to more 
environmental friendly production seems to be one of very few measures a 
government, experiencing transboundary pollution, has to internalise these 
externalities. Whether this contributes to a quicker and more efficient 
implementation process for cleaner technology is the focal question of this paper. 
We analyse the implementation of environmental friendly technology in polluting 
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plants as a sequential bargaining game between a buyer and a seller of technology. 
A government, representing a country which is negatively affected by the 
production in the polluting plant, intervenes and offers a subsidy, which is 
subtracted from the seller’s price if agreement is reached. Formally, this is a 3-
player sequential bargaining game where the buyer is a (east European) polluting 
plant and the seller is a (multinational) supplier of such technology. The 
technology in question is common, and thus we assume the seller’s costs to be 
common knowledge. Due to the tradition which developed in former eastern 
European countries of keeping information secret we assume that the buyer’s 
valuation of environmental friendly technology is private information. As the 
economic standard in the eastern part of Europe is lower than in the western part, 
the valuation does not necessarily exceed the costs of the technology. The 
government is foreign to both traders and has no interests in the trade except from 
the environmental side (internalising the externality). As the size of the 
externalities is publicly documented, we assume that the government’s valuation 
of trade is common knowledge. The government involved is only concerned with 
social welfare. However, we must hold open for the possibility that other 
governments will prioritize differently and not continue the negotiations if they 
come to power. Hence, we assume a finite bargaining game. 
 
We show that the government’s valuation of trade must exceed the upper limit of 
the buyer’s valuation net of the seller’s costs before it is optimal to intervene with 
a subsidy. Given intervention, this will step up the trading process when the 
agents are perfectly patient. With impatient agents, intervention only conditionally 
steps up the trading process. Given intervention, the possibility that no trade takes 
place, although it is profitable, is reduced.  
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Significant welfare losses due to transboundary pollution may be one reason for 
the involvement of Scandinavian and other European governments in 
environmental protection in neighbouring countries. The Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP) has since the early 1990s documented severe 
transboundary environmental degradation in the border area between Norway, 
Finland, and Russia (www.amap.no). Smith-Sivertsen (2000) documented poor 
health conditions on the Russian and Norwegian side of the same border. Both 
characteristics are ascribed to the huge emissions of sulphur dioxide from an old 
and obsolete nickel plant and a few other mineral processing plants on the Russian 
side of the border. This has caused Finland and Norway to repeatedly suggest 
efforts to reduce the emissions, and the most concrete proposal is financial 
support to cover parts of the costs of renovating the nickel plant (Aanesen 2006a).  
 
Another example is Austria. Located in the heart of Europe and bordering three 
eastern European countries; Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, it has 
experienced large influxes of transboundary pollution (www.eea.europa.eu). In 
1992 the Austrian government set up the East-Ecology Fund, which has supported 
sulphur dioxide reducing and energy saving projects located in the mentioned 
neighbouring countries along the border to Austria. Support has been in the form 
of grants to the projects, which cover about 10% of the project costs (Jackson et al 
2001).  
 
A third example is the involvement of Sweden and Denmark in environmental 
projects in the Baltic countries. Though not having common physical borders, all 
countries border the Baltic sea, a sea for which the EU has initiated an action plan 
to restore the environmental standard (Jackson et al 2001).  
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One class of bargaining games is characterised by a possibility for no gains from 
trade (the no-gap case). Under asymmetric information and given that the buyer 
may take a continuum of types, these games have a unique perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983). When there is a finite number of 
periods and a delay between the offers, the equilibrium price only asymptotically 
approaches the seller’s reservation price, and the seller uses time as a signal to 
screen the buyer. 1 Hence, ex ante agreement is only reached with a delay, and the 
equilibrium is inefficient (Sobel and Takahashi 1983, Caparros et al 2004). When 
the private information is represented by a two-point distribution, a solution is 
always reached within the first two periods, and the equilibrium is efficient 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1993, Chambers and Jensen 2002, Caparros et al 2004). An 
infinite bargaining horizon tends to prolong the delay in trade, but also to secure 
an efficient bargaining outcome (Sobel and Takahashi 1983, Fudenberg et al 
1985). Ausubel and Deneckere (1989, 1993) derive an efficient mechanism for 
sequential bargaining games with one-sided (1989) and two-sided (1993) 
asymmetric information and offers. However, only with an infinite horizon does 
this mechanism prove efficient, as the price only asymptotically reaches the 
seller’s reservation price.  
 
There are a few papers on public intervention in bargaining games. Spencer and 
Brander (1983) analyse public intervention in the form of R&D and export 
subsidies to domestic industries operating in imperfect international markets. 
Aanesen (2006b) discusses the effects of public intervention in a ‘take-it-or-leave-
                                                 
1 Without restrictions on how fast offers can be forwarded, agreement will be reached almost 
instantaneously and at a price equal to the seller’s reservation price (Gul and Sonnenschein 1986). 
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it’ transaction situation, where the interests of the intervening government may be 
due to both industrial and environmental interests. Both papers, however, use a 
static, two stage bargaining model. To our knowledge, the issue of public 
intervention in sequential bargaining with one-sided asymmetric information has 
not previously been addressed.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section Two presents the intervention model, 
derives a perfect equilibrium where the optimal subsidy is part of the equilibrium, 
and analyses the effects of intervention on the equilibrium characteristics. Section 
Three discusses the model results in the light of the empirical examples above, 
and Section Four concludes. 
 
2 A sequential bargaining model with public intervention 
 
2.1 The model 
A monopolist seller of environmental friendly technology faces a single, privately 
informed buyer, whose valuation of the good, V, is continuously and uniformly 
distributed on [ ]V,V , and for simplicity and without consequences for the results 
we set V=0. Seller’s costs (reservation price), C, is common knowledge, and we 
assume C>0. Due to a positive valuation of trade, a third agent, government, may 
intervene with a subsidy, and its reservation value, W, is common knowledge.  
 
We assume a two period trading process, where each period has two stages. At the 
first stage, the government and the seller sequentially forward their offers, and the 
government’s subsidy, if any, is subtracted from the seller’s price to give the price 
the buyer faces (net price). The buyer does nothing. At the second stage, the buyer 
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either accepts or rejects the net price, and the seller and the government do 
nothing. Being perfectly informed and rightly assuming the net price forwarded in 
each period, the buyer decides the optimal period to buy, and waiting is costly for 
all agents. At the first stage of the game, the government is the leader. Other 
sequences are also possible, but here we follow Spencer and Brander (1983) 
arguing that: 1) It is both costly and time consuming for a government to decide 
on whether to intervene in a bargaining process between private agents and on the 
optimal subsidy, and this inflexibility provides a credible commitment and places 
the government naturally in a leadership role. 2) A government needs to maintain 
a reputation for being predictable when it comes to its environmental policy, 
which also naturally places it in a leadership role.  
 
If intervention and trade take place in period n, the payoff to the seller, the buyer 
and the government respectively are given by )Cp( n
1n −−δ , )xpV( nn
1n +−−δ , 
and )xW( n
1n −−δ , where δ is the common discount factor, pn and xn are the price 
and the subsidy respectively, offered in period n, and { }2,1n∈ . The government’s 
payoff function needs some explanation. As argued above, situations exist where 
the main aim of a government’s intervention is to reduce pollution (internalising 
externalities), and where it has no other (strategic) interests. Such a framework 
departs from other contributions to the literature on public intervention in 
bargaining games (Spencer and Brander 1983, Laplante 1990, Herander 1995), 
where the government is domestic to the seller and thus has strategic interests, 
often expressed in terms of the profit of one or both traders. As the government in 
our model is foreign to both trading partners, its payoff only consists of W, which 
represents the government’s valuation of the externality.  
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If we put no restrictions on the sign of the intervention, (a negative subsidy 
represents a tax), the government faces a choice between two strategies. On one 
hand, it may realise W by offering a subsidy which reduces the buyer’s price and 
increases the probability for trade. On the other hand, it may extract the surplus 
from trade by taxing trade, which reduces the probability for trade.2 However, the 
fact that a government does not have the legal rights to tax companies registered 
in other countries excludes the possibility of a negative subsidy.  
Restricting intervention to subsidisation implies 2,1n,0xn =≥ . Let 2,1n,x
S
n =  
denote the subsidy along the unrestricted equilibrium path, i.e. when the 
intervention is not restricted to subsidisation. Then, along the equilibrium path 
S





3 However, its 
converse is not necessarily true, implying that along the unrestricted equilibrium 
path we may have a situation which involves intervention in the second period, 
but not in the first. Such a strategy is problematic. We have argued that the 
government naturally acts as a Stackelberg leader in an intervention game, which 
presupposes that it is present during the whole negotiation process and does not 
walk in and out of the negotiations, depending on whether it is in its interest to 
offer a subsidy or not. Hence, we restrict the government’s set of strategies to 
either intervene with the intention to offer a subsidy in both periods or not 
intervene at all. Formally, this implies that the restricted equilibrium subsidy, 
2,1n,x *n = , is given by  
                                                 
2 This is an optimal strategy in the case of low seller’s costs, which implies a low price and thus an 
ex ante high probability for trade, and in the case of low externalities. 
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In the case of no trade, we normalise the payoff to the agents to zero. Trade may 
take place without intervention, and in this case, the payoff to the agents is given 
above when 2,1n,0xn == . The government’s payoff in this case equals W
1n−δ , 
which is at least as high as under intervention. The reason why the government 
still may be interested in intervening is that intervention increases the probability 
for trade, and thus for W to be realised. Eliminating the possibility for negative 
prices, the net price πn is given by 2,1n},0,xpmax{ nnn =−=π . In order to 
remain in the no-gap case, we assume that 0≡≥− VWC .  
 
2.2 A perfect equilibrium in a sequential bargaining model without 
intervention 
Sobel and Takahashi (1983, Theorem 2 p 217) show that with no intervention, 


























 −= δδδδδ     (2) 
( )[ ]( ) 12 34C5622
1)(P −−−+−= δδδδ      (3) 
( )[ ]( ) 134C122)(S −−−+−= δδδδ       (4) 
                                                 
4 A no-commitment equilibrium assumes that the agents at the start of each period optimise their 
continuation payoff (the payoff from that period and onward). In contrast, a commitment 
equilibrium assumes that the agents optimise for the whole game in the first period, and then 
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where (2) and (3) give the price offered in the first and second period respectively, 
and S is the cutoff value, which defines the lowest valuation buyer who will buy 
in the first period. This perfect Bayesian equilibrium is stationary, and as part of 
the equilibrium, the buyer’s behaviour is characterised by the skimming property 
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1993, p 407). 21 PPS >>  implies a positive probability for 
trade in both periods. Buyer’s expectation about future prices is rational, and the 
seller becomes more pessimistic as to the beliefs about the buyer’s valuation when 
an offer is rejected (Fudenberg and Tirole 1983). ( ) CP2 >δ , and thus the 
equilibrium is ex ante inefficient.  
 
2.3 The perfect equilibrium under intervention 
Introducing the possibility for intervention, we look for perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium strategies for the seller and the government, and where the buyer’s 
behaviour is characterised by the skimming property. The government is restricted 
to either subsidise trade in both periods or not intervene. By backward induction, 
the last period can be analysed as a static maximisation problem, where the 
government, in the role of a Stackelberg leader, maximises the final period payoff 
taking into consideration the seller’s reaction function. The objective functions are 
given in the appendix. The last period equilibrium solution for the subsidy, the 
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where T is the cutoff value under intervention.  
 
The seller’s and the government’s first period continuation payoffs respectively 











































TV)(xW(),C,W(U 2221G δδ  (9) 
 
In the first period, the government rightly anticipates the cutoff value set by the 
seller,5 and inserting for this in (9), it maximises its continuation payoff with 
respect to the subsidy. The seller decides upon a cutoff value, i.e. the lowest 
valuation buyer to sell to in the first period. It does this by maximising its 
continuation payoff given by (8) when p1 is substituted by the reaction function 
given in (11) below, with respect to the cutoff value.  
 
Both seller and government take into consideration the buyer’s decision strategy, 
which is characterised by the skimming property. This states that higher valuation 
types of buyers buy earlier because they lose more by postponing consumption. 
The buyer uses the first offer to make predictions about future prices, and in a 
perfect equilibrium, these predictions are rational. Let p1 and x1 be the price and 
the subsidy offered in the first period. The skimming property implies that a buyer 
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with valuation TV =  will accept the net price 111 xp −=π  in the first period 
when it expects a net price equal to )T(x)T(p 222 −=π  in the last period if 
( ) ( )( )2211 xpTxpT −−≥−− δ       (10) 
 
Substituting p2 and x2 in (10) by the price and the subsidy along the unrestricted 
equilibrium paths, 2,1n,x Sn = , and solving for p1 and x1 when assuming that (10) 
is fulfilled with equality, gives the following reaction functions for the first period 























δδ .      (12) 
 
Inserting for the optimal subsidy and the optimal cutoff value in (11) yields the 
equilibrium first period price. The restricted equilibrium solution to the 
endogenous variables is given by6  
( ) ( ) ( ) )WC(VT * −+= δβδαδ       (13) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,W)VC(x *1 δεδγδ +−=       (14) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )WCVp *1 δηδγδφδ ++=       (15) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }0,WCVmax*1 δθδµδκδπ ++= .     (16) 
 
                                                                                                                                     
5 The seller’s cutoff value is formulated as a reaction to the government’s subsidy.  
6 The full expressions for the parameters are given in the appendix. 
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Having ruled out the possibility for a negative subsidy, a necessary condition for 





n δδ >>∀ . Applying a no-commitment 
equilibrium concept, this implies that the aggregate of the two (discounted) period 
payoffs under intervention must exceed the corresponding aggregate when not 





n δδ ><∀  can also be shown to hold, 
implying that intervening with a tax is more profitable than not intervening. Thus, 
when taxation is not an option, it is necessary to explicitly rule out this possibility, 
otherwise it would be part of the perfect equilibrium in a sequential bargaining 
model with intervention.  
 
Proposition 1 
When 10 <≤ δ , VWC ≥+  is a sufficient condition for intervention. When 
1=δ , VWC >+  is a necessary and sufficient condition for intervention. 
 
Proof 
The first period equilibrium subsidy is given by ( ) ( ) ( )W)VC(x *1 δεδγδ +−= . It 
can be shown that [ ] ( ) ( ) 1,1,0 =+∈∀ δεδγδ . Hence, the first period subsidy is a 
weighted sum of the seller’s and the government’s reservation value subtracted a 
term proportional in the buyer’s upper valuation limit. Along the equilibrium path 
the subsidy is continuously increasing in C, W and δ. The conjunction of 1=δ  
and VWC =+  yields 0x *1 = , hence with perfectly patient agents, it must be the 
case that VWC >+  for intervention to take place.  As the subsidy increases over 
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time, VWC >+  is a sufficient condition for 0x *2 > . For 10 <≤ δ , 0x
*
1 >  
when VWC =+ , which means that VWC ≥+  is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for intervention in the first period, as WC + slightly below V  provides 
a positive subsidy in the first period.  
QED 
 
Reformulating the condition for intervention yields WCV ≤− . Hence, when the 
highest possible “private” profit from trade is high, the externalities must also be 
high for intervention to take place. In this situation, the probability for trade 
without intervention is high, and then the externalities must be high in order to 
justify intervention. On the other hand, when the gap between the buyer’s upper 
valuation limit and the costs is small, the probability for trade is small. Then 
intervention makes a more substantial difference on whether trade will take place 
or not and can thus be justified even if the externalities are limited. Independent of 
the magnitude of C and W, the first period subsidy takes its highest value when 
.1=δ  The fact that perfectly patient agents, including the government, yield the 
highest subsidy may explain why the condition for intervention is stronger when 
.1=δ  
 
The cutoff value, T, indicates the buyer with the lowest valuation who possibly 
will buy in the first period, and the lower the cutoff value is, the higher is the 
probability that trade takes place in the first period. The delay in trade is reduced 




When 1=δ , intervention always reduces delays in trade, whereas when 
10 <≤ δ , intervention reduces delays in trade when VWC >+ .  
 
Proof 
Using (13) and (4), T*(δ) < S(δ) implies that  
( ) ( ) C)(jV)(l)WC(V δδδβδα +<−+      (17) 
where ( ) ( )( ) 11 3412)(j,34)2()(l −− −−=−−= δδδδδδ . All parameter 
expressions are positive and continuous in δ, and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1jl, ≡+=+∀ δδδβδαδ , which implies ( ) ( )δβδδδα −=− )(j)(l . 









δδα .       (17’) 
 
We restrict the proof to the case when VC < , which secures that there is a 
positive probability for trade also without intervention. It can be shown that 
[ ] ( ) ( )( ) 1
l,1,0 ≤−∈∀
δβ
δδαδ  (see figure A1 in the appendix). Hence, a sufficient 
condition for (17’) to be fulfilled is that the right hand side exceeds one. This is 
fulfilled when )CV(W −> , or when VWC >+ . Hence, when 1=δ , 
intervention always reduces delays in trade, as the condition for intervention in 
this case is VWC >+ . When 10 <≤ δ , VWC ≥+  is a sufficient condition for 
intervention, and then there are situations, i.e. when VWC =+ , where 




As the condition for intervention is stronger with perfectly patient agents, it 
should be no surprise that in this case, intervention always reduces delays in trade, 
whereas it only conditionally reduces delays in trade with impatient agents. 
 
In the last period, all buyers with valuation equal to or above the net price will 
buy. As long as the net price exceeds the seller’s reservation price net of the 
externalities, the equilibrium is ex ante inefficient. Reducing the last period net 
price increases the probability for trade and thus reduces the equilibrium 
inefficiency. Intervention reduces the last period net price when ( ) )(P2*2 δδπ < , 
where P2(δ) is given in (2). 
 
Proposition 3 
Whenever intervention is optimal for the government, the equilibrium intervention 
always reduces the equilibrium inefficiency.  
 
Proof 
( ) )(P2*2 δδπ <  implies that 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )CwVv)WC(V δδδσδρ +<−+ ,     (18) 
where we have inserted for T*(δ) in (7) to get ρ(δ) and σ(δ) (see the appendix for 
the parameter expressions). All parameter expressions are positive and continuous 
in δ, and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1wv, ≡+=+∀ δδδσδρδ , which implies 








δδρ         (18’) 
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(see figure A2 in the appendix). Hence, for intervention to reduce the equilibrium 
inefficiency it suffices that the right hand side of (18’) is equal to or above 1, or 
VWC ≥+ . Independent of the discount factor, this is always fulfilled when the 
condition for intervention is fulfilled.  
QED 
 
We have shown that the equilibrium intervention always reduces the equilibrium 
inefficiency, whereas it only conditionally reduces delays in trade. These results 
are due to the reinforcing dynamic effect of the subsidy. The subsidy increases 
over time. The delay in trade reduces when the cutoff value reduces, which in turn 
reduces in the first period subsidy. The equilibrium inefficiency reduces in the last 
period net price, which in turn reduces in the second period subsidy. Hence, the 
later in the bargaining process an intended effect of the intervention may occur, 
the more likely it is that the effect actually takes place.  
 
3 The effects of intervention 
In some respects, intervention alters the perfect equilibrium of the original model, 
whereas other characteristics remain the same. When the agents are impatient, 
there is a trade-off between buying in an early period at a high price and buying 
later at a lower price. With perfectly patient agents this trade-off does not exist, as 
a perfectly patient buyer is indifferent with respect to when to buy. Hence, in the 
original model, when the buyer becomes perfectly patient, the same price is 
offered in each period and the buyer buys in the first period or never. Also under 
intervention, the net price remains the same when the agents are perfectly patient. 
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However, this constant price now blurs totally different strategies for the seller 
and the government. The government exploits its power as Stackelberg leader and 
decreases the subsidy over time. In isolation, this contributes to decreasing the 
probability for trade. The government can do so because it knows the optimal 
response of the seller. The seller, in turn, knows the optimal net price to offer a 
perfectly patient buyer and has no better option than fixing its price in order to 
ensure that this net price is offered.  
 
When the iron curtain fell, a large gap in the economic standard between the 
eastern and the western part of Europe was revealed. In this situation, both the 
east European governments and the populations were more impatient to increase 
the economic wealth than to improve the state of the environment (Ready 2002). 
Hence, it is acceptable to assume that the buyer, i.e. a polluting plant in an east 
European country, had low (no) time costs when it came to environmental efforts. 
Assuming a perfectly patient seller, this is a beneficial situation for a perfectly 
patient government to intervene, as it would be able to exploit its first mover 
advantage and “force” the seller to secure that the optimal net price is offered. 
Hence, the results of the intervention model indicate that governments intervening 
with a subsidy in a bargaining process with perfectly patient traders probably also 
have very low (no) time costs. In the transboundary pollution case between 
Norway, Finland and Russia the negotiations took place over nearly a decade. The 
intervention model results show that as the common time costs increase, both the 
government and the seller are worse off the longer the negotiations last. Hence, 
given low time costs for the buyer, it is reasonable to assume low time costs also 
for the governments (in Norway and Finland) and the seller, as with high time 
costs staying in the negotiations would be costly. 
19 
 
On the other hand, as one of the intended and realised effects of intervention is to 
reduce delays in trade, one can argue that the governments in this situation would 
be rather impatient to reach results in order to realise welfare gains.    
 
Intervention may affect the equilibrium price path of the seller in two obvious 
ways: 1) increase the price, 2) increase the probability of trade. A closer 
inspection of the restricted equilibrium price path under intervention discloses a 
third option; 3) a decrease in the seller’s price. This latter option is an equilibrium 
strategy in both periods when the condition for intervention is only tightly 
fulfilled, i.e. CV − is close to W, and when the time costs are low, i.e. 1≈δ . 
Under these conditions, the government may not be interested in intervening if the 
seller confiscates a part of the subsidy, as the increase in payoff in form of 
increased probability for trade would then be too low. Hence, by lowering the 
price the seller directly contributes to increasing the probability for trade.  
 
When the condition for intervention is fulfilled with a margin, i.e. WCV <− , the 
seller’s equilibrium strategy implies to confiscate a part of the subsidy, but still 
ensure that the probability for trade increases compared to when there is no 
intervention. The higher the time costs are, the higher is the share of the subsidy 
the seller confiscates and the lower is the increase in the probability for trade due 
to intervention.  
 
Low seller’s costs and low externalities hinder intervention. Low seller’s costs 
imply a low price and in turn a high ex ante probability that trade will take place 
even without intervention. Hence, the contribution of the subsidy to increase the 
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probability for trade is limited, and the costs of the subsidy exceed the increase in 
government’s payoff due to increased probability for trade. Similarly, low 
externalities restrict the size of the subsidy and thus the reduction in the net price 
due to intervention. This in turn restricts the increase in the probability for trade to 
take place due to intervention. Regarding the transboundary pollution in the 
Finnish-Norwegian-Russian border area it is a fact that the modernisation of the 
obsolete and polluting plant would be costly (Kola Science Centre 1992) and that 
the externalities were large (www.amap.no), both of which increases the 
probability for intervention.  
 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
Transboundary pollution causes an externality which is often not internalised 
when decisions regarding abatement efforts are taken. This leads to inefficient 
adjustments with respect to abatement efforts for the affected area irrespective of 
borders. In this paper we have demonstrated that public intervention in a 
sequential bargaining game reduces such inefficiencies, i.e. it conditionally 
reduces delays in trade and it with certainty increases the probability that 
abatement efforts are implemented when this is profitable. Our results indicate 
that the conjunction of a low (upper limit of) buyer’s valuation of trade, high 
seller’s costs and low (common) time costs makes intervention attractive for a 
government, and thus increases the probability for intervention, and we argue that 
at least the two former characteristics have been present in cases of public 
intervention to promote environmental protection in Europe the last decades.  
 
Examples from Europe show that in situations with transboundary pollution and 
not internalised externalities, the negatively affected agents have intervened with a 
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subsidy which is realised if the polluter meets an agreement about trade with a 
seller of environmental friendly technology. The most prominent example is 
probably the Finnish and Norwegian governments intervening in the process of 
modernising the obsolete and very polluting nickel plant in the Russian town 
Nikel. Although an agreement about reconstructing the plant and thus reducing 
the sulphur dioxide emissions by 90% was signed in 2001, the reconstruction is 
still not completed. However, a former Norwegian minister of the Environment 
underlined that without the Norwegian involvement the process of reducing the 
sulphur emissions from the nickel plant would probably not have been on the 
agenda at all (Norwegian Ministry of the Environment, 2007). Also, several 
projects under the joint implementation mechanism (JI, now clean development 
mechanism, CDM) in the Kyoto protocol have come into force, and among these 
are projects where west European governments have contributed financially in 
order to promote the upgrading of obsolete and polluting energy supply systems in 
bordering east European countries (Jackson et al 2001). Although difficult to 
verify, it is realistic to assume that many of these plants would not have been 
upgraded at that time, or at all, without the public intervention from west 
European governments.  
 
Extensions of the model presented in this paper could answer the new questions 
these empirical cases raise. First, the government’s payoff only encompasses 
aspects of social welfare (internalising externalities). This was to concentrate on 
the environmental aspect of the intervention, not including strategic intentions 
such as the promotion of domestic industries. However, aspects of the empirical 
examples we rest on suggest that the intervening governments may, at some 
stages, also have had strategic interests. This probably was the case for the 
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Finnish government, which withdrew its grant to the reconstruction of the nickel 
work in the Russian town Nikel when the offer of more environmental friendly 
technology, supplied by a consortium led by the Finnish company Outokumpu, 
was rejected. It is of interest to analyse how an extension of the government’s 
interests to include also strategic interests will affect the results presented in this 
paper.   
 
Admittedly, simplifying the model by assuming a common discount factor has 
consequences for the results. In the original model, Sobel and Takahashi (1983, p 
417) show that the seller is made better off when the buyer’s time costs increase, 
whereas the buyer is made worse off when the seller’s time costs decrease. It is of 
interest to explore further how varying the time costs between the agents affects 
the results of the intervention model.  
 
Finally, the strategic interaction between the government and the seller in the first 
stage is defined exogenously and assumed to be a Stackelberg game with the 
government as the leader. This is in accordance with previous literature (Spencer 
and Brander 1983), and other empirical facts also support this assumption. 
However, other types of the first stage game are possible, and it might also be 
endogenous to the model which game the seller and the government plays when 
fixing the price and the subsidy in the initial phase. Such changes of bargaining 





In the last period, the seller, being the follower in a Stackelberg game where the 



















=  (A2). The optimal subsidy for the government to set 
in the last period, given that the seller sets the price p2, is given 













xpTxWmax 2222x  (A3). Inserting p2
R for p2 in (A3) and solving 
the restricted optimisation problem gives (5). Inserting for (5) in (A2) gives (6).  
 
In the first period, the seller first fixes a cutoff value and then decides the optimal 
price. The cutoff value is found by maximising the continuation payoff in (8) 
when having inserted for the last period equilibrium expressions and substituted 
p1 by the reaction function in (11). This leads to the following expression for the 





















1((),C,W(U δδδδ  (A4) 
Maximising (A4) with respect to T gives the optimal cutoff value as a reaction to 



























The government’s continuation payoff, when inserting for the last period 




































































The government maximises its continuation pay-off with respect to x1 and takes 
into consideration the seller’s prising strategy (optimal cutoff value). This yields 
(14). Inserting for (14) in (A5) yields (13). Finally, inserting for (13) and (14) in 
(11) yields (15).  
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The continuation payoff to the government by intervention exceeds the 




































− δδ  (A7) 
Reformulated (A7) can be expressed as  
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0TxpxVTxxpPW1TSW 2221222 >−−+−++−+−− δδδ  (A7’) 
By inserting for the endogenous variables as given by (13)-(16) and the parameter 
expressions above in (A7’), this inequality can be expressed as a function of the 
exogenous variables W, V , and δ. However, due to its complexity and the fact 
that the three exogenous variables may take a range of values, it is not possible to 
pin down to an explicit, unambiguous condition for the inequality in (A7’) to be 
fulfilled. We thus have tested the inequality numerically for all relevant 
26 
combinations of variable values on W, V , and δ , and by this can show that the 
inequality always holds.      
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